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During recent decades, the rapid pace of financial markets involv-
ing new modes of management, governance, and regulation has framed 
business firms. This corporate drift toward financialization is summa-
rized under the “shareholder value” label. What do financial markets do? 
Unequivocally, they organize trading on shares that are securities: trad-
able financial entitlements established by law, which formalize expecta-
tions, and claims of financial rents paid by the issuing company.1 Actu-
ally, how continued quotation on share exchanges came to be the ba-
rometer of economic or social welfare is a different matter. The latter 
adoption has required quite a great leap from “the euthanasia of the ren-
tier, of the functionless investor”2 involving changes in, and reforms of, 
monetary and financial architectures at policy-making and regulatory 
levels; banking and financial institutions; shareholding, monetary, and 
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 1. Together with shares, including their issuance and buyback, other financial arrangements 
deal with the linkage of finance to business activities, including bonds and debts, structured financial 
instruments, stock options, and pension schemes. 
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investment funds (including pension and insurance); and the manage-
ment, organization, and accounting of business firms. This general trend 
has been further shaped by transnational imitation between various so-
cioeconomic environments and regulatory regimes, led by some global 
institutions.3 
The shareholder value revolution has involved peculiar beliefs and 
ideas on (1) what financial markets can actually do, and (2) what they are 
indirectly concerned with—that is, ongoing firms having internal organi-
zation and management. Shareholder value relates to the efficient finan-
cial markets rhetoric (point 1).4 Behind its academic foundations in the 
late developments of neoclassical financial economics,5 securities market 
makers utilize this rhetoric to affirm their social role and advertise their 
financial “products” to clients and citizens. Belief in the magic of the 
share exchange is fuelled, and firms become the very commodity that 
trading is constructed upon. Financial markets trade on legal entitlements 
whose “values” relate—in principle—to financial performance and posi-
tion of business firms.6 In order to be submitted to securities markets—
today considered as the center of economy and society—business firms 
have been reduced to financial placements (point 2). The peculiar effi-
cient market rhetoric already applied to the working of financial markets 
is then replicated within the firm. The latter comes to be seen as a portfo-
lio of disparate financial assets and liabilities held on behalf of investors, 
who trade on shares issued by the firm itself. On this basis, shareholder 
value has reshaped the corporate activity, fostering new practices of inte-
grated financial management.7 
                                                 
 3. See generally VINCENT BIGNON, YURI BIONDI & XAVIER RAGOT, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF FAIR VALUE: ACCOUNTING AS A VECTOR OF CRISIS (2009); SPECIAL ISSUE: THE SOCIO-
ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTING, 5 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 585 (Yuri Biondi & Tomo Suzuki eds., 2007); 
Richard Deeg & Gregory Jackson, Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety, 5 SOCIO-
ECON. REV. 149 (2007); Steven L. Schwarcz, Framing Address: A Framework for Analyzing Finan-
cial Market Transformation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299 (2013); Karel Williams, From Shareholder 
Value to Present-Day Capitalism, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 1 (2000); Yuri Biondi et al., Governing the 
Business Enterprise: Ownership, Institutions, Society (Comparative Research in Law & Political 
Econ., Working Paper No. 13/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440889. 
 4. See sources cited supra note 3 and infra note 7. 
 5. Cf. Yuri Biondi, Disagreement-Based Trading and Speculation: Implications for Financial 
Regulation and Economic Theory, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Biondi, Disagreement-
Based Trading]; Yuri Biondi, Money Without Value, Accounting Without Measure: How Economic 
Theory Can Better Fit the Economic and Monetary System We Live In [hereinafter Biondi, Money 
Without Value], in MONEY AND CALCULATION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 34 
(Massimo Amato, Luigi Doria & Luca Fantacci eds., 2010); Yuri Biondi, Pierpaolo Giannoccolo & 
Serge Galam, What Does Financial Market Do? The Formation of Share Market Prices Under 
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Common Knowledge, 391 PHYSICA A 5532 (2012). 
 6. Issuance from governments and other entities are neglected here for the sake of simplicity. 
 7. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate 
Performance: A Post-Enron Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE 
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According to Karl Polanyi, classical and neoclassical economic 
theories are characterized by an alleged extension of “our obsolete mar-
ket mentality” to every socioeconomic activity.8 A combination of mar-
ket and ownership then reveals the true value of everything through mar-
ket prices, generating a spontaneous economic and social order among 
liberated individuals. Polanyi’s seminal work, The Great Transforma-
tion, identified three “fallacious commodities”: land, money, and human 
work.9 While these three human activities are significant for the economy 
and society, they do not imply either the existence of, or the need for, 
market coordination.  
The same fallacy applies to the firm nowadays. Shareholder value 
fallaciously reduces the firm to a commodity, taking the form of a trad-
able security. A firm is factually a significant socioeconomic activity, but 
its reduction and reification to ownership rights traded on financial mar-
kets features the shareholder value rhetoric. While trading factually ex-
ists on shares and other legal entitlements issued through the legal struc-
ture of the firm, only the shareholder value rhetoric argues that the whole 
economy of the business firm does—and should—depend on that share 
market pricing throughout time. 
This paper aims to address some theoretical problems with share-
holder value that come from its misguided understanding of shareholding 
and the business firm. Shareholder value relies on complementary views 
that point to market and ownership to understand the dynamics of both 
securities markets and the enterprise activity. But what happens when 
shares, acquired at a definite price in a given circumstance, relate to the 
enterprise congeries of legal and economic systems involving flows and 
immobilizations that require an accounting system to explicate them? 
                                                                                                             
GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Peter Cornelius & Bruce M. Kogut 
eds., 2003) (providing legal-economic preconceptions); William Lazonick, The Financialization of 
the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
857 (2013); Williams, supra note 3; see also MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2005) (providing in-
sightful macroeconomic analysis); Robert Boyer, Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a Viable Alter-
native to Fordism? A Preliminary Analysis, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 111 (2000) (providing insightful 
macroeconomic analyses); Julie Froud et al., Shareholder Value and Financialisation: Consultancy 
Promises, Management Moves, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 80 (2000) (discussing the managerial foundations 
of shareholder value); William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A 
New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000) (discussing the managerial 
foundations of shareholder value). In addition, Thomas Clarke edited a comprehensive collection on 
theoretical foundations of corporate governance, entitled Theories of Corporate Governance: The 
Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance. 
 8. See generally Karl Polanyi, Our Obsolete Market Mentality, 3 COMMENTARY 109, 109–17 
(1947), reprinted in PRIMITIVE, ARCHAIC AND MODERN ECONOMIES: ESSAYS OF KARL POLANYI 59, 
68–77 (George Dalton ed., 1968). 
 9. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 68–77 (1944). 
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Financial crises, scandals, and shortcomings testify against the un-
holy trinity of market, property, and shareholder value. Instead of assur-
ing ever-progressive advances in economic and social welfare, share-
holder value proves to raise unaddressed issues of stability and fairness. 
Enterprises that were its glorious forerunners, such as Enron and Lehman 
Brothers, have generated material and fraudulent losses, encountering 
evergreen troubles of sustainability, responsibility, and accountability. 
The magic of financial markets turned to be black. Mark-to-market ac-
counting, claimed to be “fair” value, was suddenly dismissed once mar-
ket prices disruptively decreased and financial markets experienced sys-
temic failures.10 Accordingly, many scholars have recently acknowl-
edged that reforms are necessary to protect stakeholders, including 
shareholders, but also human community and nature at large. 
Together with regulatory and organizational changes, new beliefs 
and ideas addressed in this paper were crucial in the ascension of the 
shareholder value rhetoric. Remedying the current impasse, then, may 
require not only careful exercises in regulatory reform and policymaking, 
but also some theoretical upgrades. The misguided understanding of 
what securities markets and firms are, or should be, has framed received 
policies and the entire concern with “corporate governance.” 
This Article engages this theoretical challenge by drawing upon the 
concept of the firm as an “enterprise entity,” which has significant impli-
cations for governance and disclosure. It argues that the enterprise entity 
is a comprehensive approach to the firm that integrates accounting, eco-
nomics, and law, thus improving on the received understanding of the 
firm. Part II discusses a framework based on the concept of the firm as 
an enterprise entity. Part III then contrasts this framework with three 
alternative views on the firm that jointly constitute the shareholder value 
rhetoric: the “black box,” the “proprietor-entrepreneur,” and the “legal 
person.” Further, these views are criticized as “daydreams.” Finally, Part 
IV applies this comparative assessment to matters of corporate govern-
ance and disclosure, clarifying the novel approach to governance and 
disclosure of the business firm. 
                                                 
 10. On October 3, 2008, the so-called “Financial Institutions Bailout Bill,” also known as the 
“Paulson Plan,” included two sections—132 and 133—relating to fair-value (mark-to-market) 
accounting. The first gave authority to the SEC to suspend this method of accounting for reasons of 
public interest and investor protection. The second section mandated further studies on its effects on 
balance sheets of firms, its impact on the quality of financial information, its role on bank failures in 
2008, the process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in developing related 
accounting standards, advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards, and alternative 
accounting standards to those already in place concerning fair value. European Union authorities 
took analogous decisions. 
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II. THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE ENTITY 
The idea of the firm as an enterprise entity implies a comprehensive 
approach that integrates accounting with economics and law, as the no-
tion of entity is already common to all three disciplines and practices.11 
This approach comprehends the firm as a managed, dynamic system, 
jointly constituted by two basic relationships as shown in figure 1: the 
enterprise core, which denotes the management of an economic organiza-
tion mediated by an accounting system, and its governance, which makes 
management accountable to various undertaking stakeholders for enter-
prise income and results (performance). 
 
Figure 1: The Firm as an Enterprise Entity12 
 
 
This functional system is characterized by different “structures of 
production”:13 institutional, organizational, and epistemic structures.14 
                                                 
 11. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 
(Yuri Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY]; 
Yuri Biondi, The Firm as an Entity: Management, Organization, Accounting (Università Degli Studi 
di Brescia, Working Paper No. 46, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=774764. 
 12. Biondi, supra note 11, at 32. 
 13. See generally R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 
713 (1992). 
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The latter respectively relates to the place and role of institutions, inter-
nal organization, and knowledge within the firm. The concept of the en-
terprise entity aims to frame together these dimensions of the business 
enterprise.15 
Theoretically speaking, the entity approach reacts to a “sense of 
lacking” in the current state of economic theory and practice concerning 
the firm. Notwithstanding its theoretical and heuristic advances, a market 
bias can be identified in received approaches to the enterprise activity. 
This bias leads to an understanding of socioeconomic dynamics on a 
distinctive individualistic vein, neglecting collective and dynamic dimen-
sions that feature the enterprise activity over time. Conversely, the enter-
prise entity approach employs insightful suggestions from leading schol-
ars, such as the following: Simon, who addresses the special economic 
organization of the firm as a dynamic system;16 Shubik, who deals with 
the relationship between accounting and the critique of equilibrium eco-
nomics of the firm;17 Coase, who explores the accounting contribution to 
the theory of the firm;18 and Berle, who criticizes the classical view of 
the proprietor-entrepreneur under the economic and financial conditions 
that have characterized firms since the twentieth century.19 Moreover, the 
enterprise entity approach draws upon traditions of thought from eco-
nomics, accounting, and law that address the business firm and its impact 
upon economy and society, especially the continental European tradition 
of accounting and business economics20 and old institutional economics 
developed both in the United States and Europe.21 All together, these 
theoretical perspectives offer a solid background for understanding the 
firm as an entity: a whole, dynamic system. Accordingly, the firm is then 
(1) understood as an enterprise entity (dynamic system), (2) character-
ized by a specific economic and monetary process, which (3) generates 
incomes to the firm, (4) while being confronted with the actual dynamics 
                                                 
 15. Biondi, supra note 11. 
 16. See generally Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, reprinted in THE FIRM AS AN 
ENTITY, supra note 11, at 54. 
 17. See generally Martin Shubik, Accounting and its Relationship to General Equilibrium 
Theory, reprinted in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 73. 
 18. See generally Ronald H. Coase, Accounting and the Theory of the Firm, reprinted in THE 
FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 82. 
 19. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Impact of the Corporation on Classical Economic 
Theory, reprinted in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 92; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory 
of Enterprise Entity [hereinafter Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity], reprinted in THE FIRM AS 
AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 186. 
 20. ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS ECONOMICS: INSIGHTS FROM NATIONAL TRADITIONS (Yuri 
Biondi & Stefano Zambon eds., 2012). 
 21. See generally THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11. For references to recent advances, 
see infra Part V (concluding).  
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and complexity of socioeconomic reality (unfolding and undeter-
mined).22 
The entity approach has implications for corporate systems of gov-
ernance and disclosure.23 Significantly, accounting systems are integral 
parts of the institutional framework of the enterprise entity, demonstrat-
ing the joint implications of economic, accounting, and legal matters 
within the firm. In an enterprise affair fraught with unfolding changes—
together with asymmetries of resources, access, control, and informa-
tion—the accounting system copes with the economic and monetary 
process generated by the whole enterprise over time, defining the repre-
sentation of entity capital (assets and liabilities) and income (revenues 
and costs). In this way, the accounting system allows this special process 
to exist and function autonomously from, and interactively with, share-
holding and trading. Thus, accounting systems lie at the core of the con-
tinuity and sustainability of the enterprise entity, mediating immanent 
conflicts of interests among various stakeholders, including sharehold-
ers.24 
This comprehensive understanding of the firm as an enterprise en-
tity contrasts with the shareholder value rhetoric, which frames the firm 
with securities markets and ownership rights. A market basis reduces the 
whole firm to a “black box,” while an ownership basis submits it to a 
lonely proprietor-entrepreneur or an autocratic “legal person.” The fol-
lowing part provides a comparative analysis of these four approaches to 
the socio-economy of the business firm. 
III. BEHIND SHAREHOLDER VALUE RHETORIC 
The view of the firm as an enterprise entity contrasts with three al-
ternative views that jointly compose the shareholder value rhetoric. The 
firm is either made entirely dependent on external markets (especially 
securities markets), or framed with, and submitted to inside ownership 
rights or outside legal order as shown in table 1 below. Overall, this 
rhetoric entirely submits the economy of the firm to the primacy of 
shareholders, as stated by an accounting scholar quoting Milton Fried-
man in the 1960s: 
                                                 
 22. See Biondi, supra note 11. 
 23. See generally THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11; Yuri Biondi, What Do Shareholders 
Do? Accounting, Ownership and the Theory of the Firm: Implications for Corporate Governance 
and Reporting, 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2012). 
 24. Yuri Biondi, The Problem of Social Income: The Entity View of the Cathedral, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1025 (2011) [hereinafter Biondi, The Problem of Social Income]; Yuri Biondi, The Pure 
Logic of Accounting: A Critique of the Fair Value Revolution, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011) [herein-
after Biondi, The Pure Logic of Accounting]. 
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The proprietary concept [of the firm] seems to personify the tradi-
tional, classical ideology of capitalism. This is reflected in a state-
ment by the economist, Milton Friedman, a prominent advocate of 
that ideology, when he decries the concept of social responsibility 
that many corporate officials “profess” to have adopted: “Few 
trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our 
free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social re-
sponsibility other than to make as much money for the stockholders 
as possible.”25 
He further states that “[t]he corporation is an instrument of the stock-
holders who own it.”26 Friedman can be taken as one influential epigone 
of the tradition of thought already criticized by Karl Polanyi in its gen-
eral premises and implications.27 In this way, the shareholder value rhet-
oric has disseminated distinctive daydreams that table 1 summarizes and 
compares with the enterprise entity approach advocated in this Article. 






















                                                 
 25. Reginald S. Gynther, Accounting Concepts and Behavioral Hypotheses, 42 ACCT. REV. 
274, 279 (1967) (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)). 
 26. Id. (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 25). 
 27. Jean-Philippe Robé, Being Done with Milton Friedman, 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2012). 
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A. Daydreaming of the Firm as a “Black Box” 
Some endorsers of shareholder value more or less explicitly refer to 
the conception of the firm as a “black box.” This view points to a neo-
classical economic posture that pretends to understand the firm on a 
market basis; the inner intricacies of the business are “blacked out” to 
those outside, while external market prices for inputs (including fictitious 
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commodities such as land, money, and human work) and outputs capture 
the economic and monetary process of the firm. In fact, the history of 
economic thought sheds some light into this no-longer-empty box. On 
the contrary, this market approach to the firm provides a peculiar under-
standing based upon (1) a shallow nexus of (market) prices or (complete) 
contracts, characterized by (2) a mechanical link between price and cost 
for each product separately (marginal cost pricing), and (3) a unique 
objective of “profit maximization”—a profit that shall result to be null, 
like in the punishment of Tantalus,28 (4) under idealized conditions ab-
stracted away from time, hazard, and interaction.29 
This set of assumptions allows the firm as such to vanish in a sys-
tem of efficient market pricing. The whole firm no longer has any role in 
economy and society. Indeed, what about corporate governance and so-
cial responsibility of its management? If managers should disclose in-
formation about their activity and the business incomes generated, they 
may discharge their responsibility upon markets that they must follow. 
Markets, especially the share exchange, are then at the core of the eco-
nomics of the firm. 
B. Daydreaming of the Firm as a Proprietor-Entrepreneur 
Some advocates of shareholder value argue for another daydream, 
which understands the firm as a legal-economic device of its proprietor-
entrepreneur.30 This time, the firm disappears in favor of this lone captain 
of his own business. This capitalistic hero alone bears the risks, under-
taking the management of the entire enterprise. The firm and its person-
nel are nothing but his instruments, playing no role in decision making, 
organization, or control, because the solitary owner is all that matters. 
This approach understands the firm as the following: (1) a form of own-
ership and wealth, providing (2) a legal and economic device for the 
                                                 
 28. In Greek mythology, Tantalus (Greek Τάνταλος, Tántalos) suffered an eternal punishment 
in Tartarus. Tantalus was made to stand in a pool of water beneath a fruit tree with low branches 
with the fruits ever eluding his grasp and the water always receding before he could take a drink. He 
was the son of the nymph Plouto (“riches,” as in gold and other mineral wealth) and the grandchild 
of Chthonia (“Earth”). From the name “Tantalus” originates the English verb “to tantalize.” 
 29. Shubik, supra note 17; see also Martin Shubik, A Note on Accounting and Economic 
Theory: Past, Present, and Future, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011). 
 30. We must insist here on the presence of only one entrepreneur or a mythical existence of 
one universal and fully homogeneous class of them, because absent such an individualistic and 
reductionist assumption, the presence of several heterogeneous proprietor-entrepreneurs would 
include an interactive and holistic dimension that this approach purposefully excludes and is unable 
to deal with. Lynn Stout masterfully explains this concept in her article New Thinking on “Share-
holder Primacy,” 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2012). See also Jack Hirshleifer, Investment Decision 
Criteria, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & 
Peter Newman eds., 1987). 
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solitary owner, (3) with a unique objective of generating rents from that 
wealth, (4) under ideal conditions of complete contracting and perfect 
enforcement. 
Once again, the firm as such disappears in a system of fully en-
forceable ownership rights. The whole firm has no role in economy and 
society. Concerning governance and social responsibility of its manage-
ment, the latter may discharge any responsibility upon the owner, whom 
it must obey. Thus, ownership is at the core of the economics of the firm 
under this approach. 
C. Daydreaming of the Firm as a “Legal Person” 
A further daydream understands the firm as an artificially created 
legal person having its own life, including citizenship rights, like a citi-
zen that is a human being.31 This self-serving giant runs its business in a 
world of pure law. All that matters then is this solitary legal person artifi-
cially incorporated by law or statute. This viewpoint understands the firm 
as (1) a self-standing holder of ownership and wealth and (2) an auto-
cratic owner and decision maker, (3) with a subjective objective of what-
ever the legal person wants under law or statute, (4) in a world of pure 
law entirely comprised by, and reduced to, those laws and statutes. 
This approach is often associated with the proprietor approach. As 
stated by an accounting scholar in the 1950s, “[t]hose who believe the 
accounting entity should be personified are known as the proprietary 
theorists, and those who believe that the entity should not be personified 
are known as the entity theorists.”32 
Here, ownership is understood through an outside legal order estab-
lished by laws and statutes, instead of an inside legal order based upon 
ownership rights. But, as usual, the firm disappears in this framework, 
reduced to an artificial person that legally exists as human beings do. If 
management of this person should disclose information about its activity 
and the business incomes generated, it may discharge any responsibility 
upon that person whom it must obey. The firm is then reduced to one of 
its legal forms, the corporation, which becomes an “island of absolute 
                                                 
 31. See, e.g., Yuri Biondi, The Enterprise Entity and the Constitution of the American Econom-
ic Republic, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011). 
 32. Walter G. Kell, Should the Accounting Entity be Personified?, 28 ACCT. REV. 40, 42 
(1953). John R. Commons refuted the personification of the going concern that constitutes the basic 
unit of analysis in his institutional economics: “The false analogies may be condensed into three 
analogies of mechanism, organism, and personification, since they consist in transferring to econom-
ics the ideas properly employed in physics, physiology, or individual psychology. These, we con-
ceive, may be avoided by substituting the two ideas of transactions and going concerns.” JOHN R. 
COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 96 (1934). 
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power.”33 Considering that corporate law usually grants decision making 
collectively to shareholders and their fiduciary delegates, the way is then 
paved to a plutocracy that is problematic in a socioeconomic republic.34 
D. The Problems with Daydreams Driven by Shareholder Value 
However influential and significant these daydreams are, they in-
volve problems that go beyond the emotional (and political) reactions for 
or against them. These views are at odds with the reality of business 
firms as they exist and function in our economy and society. For in-
stance, firms combine a number of corporate and other legal arrange-
ments (including contracts and regulations concerned with labor, investor 
protection, financial securities, foods and drugs, environment, and anti-
trust). These arrangements jointly generate the triple separation between 
ownership, control, and management (not only the separation between 
ownership and control that is recently stressed) that Berle and Means 
already recognized in their seminal work.35 To work through this legal-
economic web, management does not, and cannot, rely exclusively on 
outside market pricing, but maintains accounting systems that are modes 
of looking inside the ongoing enterprise process fraught with time, haz-
ard, and interaction. Accounting systems, not price systems, enable ac-
tors—management, stakeholders, and regulators—to know, organize, or 
govern that process. 
Widespread conceptions of the black box, the proprietor-
entrepreneur, and the legal person contrast with this special legal and 
accounting field generated by the enduring economy of the business 
firm. Specifically, law and accounting provide evidence for the func-
tional distinction between the firm and its alleged “owners.” The legal 
structure of the firm involves a number of various legal forms (including 
corporations) that hold and possess resources, enter into contracts and 
                                                 
 33. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (“As D.H. Robert-
son points out [in the Control of Industry], we find ‘islands of conscious power in this ocean of 
unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.’”). 
 34. A predatory plutocracy was stigmatized by Thorstein Veblen and Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Berle 
wrote:  
‘[A]bsolute control’ . . . [of corporations without property] was part of the plutocratic age 
which prevailed through the last three decades of the nineteenth and the first decade of 
the twentieth century, leaving a reminiscent mark on the culture of the United 
States. . . . Perhaps there is a passing recrudescence of the era in Texas, due chiefly to 
certain accepted loopholes in income tax law, to fortunate oil discoveries, and to a mass 
upsurge in need for petroleum.  
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 72–73 (1959). 
 35. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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obligations, and have priority rights and control on flows, incomes, and 
results.36 Furthermore, through the accounting system, prudential regula-
tion and investor protection restrict dividend payments and equity re-
payments from the firm to its shareholders or partners. Through this 
same system, fiscal regulation establishes the basis for income tax that is 
determined and eventually paid out before net earnings are shared be-
tween shareholders and partners.37 Therefore, ownership by isolated in-
dividuals is framed and shaped by a “phantom” entity that the idea of a 
“solitary owner” cannot cope with.38 
In this context, the legal person transforms that phantom into a 
“Frankenstein incorporated.”39 But a republican order establishes corpo-
rations and other legal entities as intermediary bodies that are objects, not 
subjects, of the law.40 The legal person idea conflicts with constitutional 
features of these bodies. In particular, the legal structure of firms com-
prises, or is disintegrated by, a myriad of legal entities and other legal 
devices, which makes it hazardous to identify that person, even if artifi-
cial. These socioeconomic wholes submit a legal order, voluntarily and 
compulsorily regulated by consent and the law. Specifically, they inte-
grate the polity through a system of collective and continued decision 
making governed by fiduciary representatives who run and supervise 
those bodies on behalf of their constituencies, including shareholders in 
the case of corporate law. Indeed, these bodies respond and are submitted 
to a variety of inside and outside checks and balances to assure their con-
sistent and continued role in economy and society. In sum, while legal 
personality is a convenient legal device (or object) that is properly 
framed and shaped by private and public orderings, the idea of an artifi-
cially created legal person is inconsistent with the integration of the firm 
into the institutional framework of economy and society. 
                                                 
 36. For example, any shareholder that used a corporate car for a day would likely be arrested—
quite a peculiar owner’s right in the firm indeed. 
 37. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Taxation, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Business Enterprise 
(Comprehensive Research in Law & Political Econ., Working Paper No. 19, 2009) (discussing the 
legal-economic foundations of taxation under different conceptions of the business firm); see also 
Henrik J. Kleven, Claus T. Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, Why Can Modern Governments Tax So 
Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 15218, 2009). 
 38. Longstanding legal debates on the nature of public corporation deal with this issue, which 
depends on a misleading focus on individual entrepreneurship and ownership. The notion of the 
enterprise entity aims to encompass these debates by understanding the legal structure of the firm as 
a system of multiple legal arrangements including, but not limited to, corporations. See generally 
Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, supra note 19; Kurt A. Strasser & Phillip Blumberg, Legal 
Form and Economic Substance of Enterprise Groups: Implications for Legal Policy, 1 ACCT. ECON. 
& L. 1 (2011). 
 39. I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931). 
 40. Biondi, supra note 31. 
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Just as the legal person daydream is contrary to the reality of the 
firm as an entity, the black box idea does not capture the entity phantom. 
This view assumes that the price system (the market) is sufficient to rep-
resent, organize, and govern the business activity of firms. The firm is 
then supposed to be neutral to socioeconomic dynamics; institutions 
should not matter in the enterprise field. Accordingly, no enterprise in-
flows and outflows would exist except for efficient market prices. 
In fact, the firm and its dynamics do matter in the economic and 
monetary process. They generate a socioeconomic field that frames and 
shapes the ongoing generation of income that all stakeholders, including 
shareholders, have interests in.41 Representation, organization, and gov-
ernance of this enterprise process require an accounting system, not a 
price system, because the accounting system defines economic revenues 
and costs attached to the reference period through “accruals,” the deter-
mination of the accounting entity perimeter, the retained concept of capi-
tal maintenance, and other technicalities that encompass the monetary 
dimension. Contrary to the black box view, the firm cannot be reduced to 
a simplistic “nexus of monetary flows (prices)” because the accounting 
system goes far beyond the cash basis through its definition and applica-
tion of accruals, consolidation, and other accounting technicalities.42 
Moreover, prior financial literature has argued for the impact of 
taxation and dividend policies on shareholder value.43 In fact, accounting 
systems provide the basis of taxation and dividend distribution. This 
accounting basis is not a market basis; rather, it enables the accounting 
system to establish gross and net earnings through revenues and ex-
penses, as well as assets and liabilities. These earnings may be partly or 
fully distributed to shareholders or partners, and provide the basis to 
determine enterprise income taxation, maintenance of prudential re-
serves, allowance of executive compensation, and so forth.44 All stake-
holders, including shareholders, jointly hold interests in, and eventually 
expect to be satisfied through, this income. 
Thus, the accounting system provides a common representation of 
business capital and income to the firm, which becomes a joint concern 
over time. The accounting system structures this enterprise process of 
becoming through time, establishing the firm as an enterprise entity. This 
                                                 
 41. Shyam Sunder, Extensive Income and Value of the Firm: Who Gets What? (Comprehensive 
Research in Law & Political Econ., Working Paper No. 20, 2009). 
 42. Biondi, Money Without Value, supra note 5. 
 43. See generally M.J. Gordon, Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Prices, 41 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 99 (1959); John Lintner, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained 
Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (1956); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corpo-
rate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963). 
 44. See generally Biondi, supra note 23. 
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enterprise process is concerned with uncertainties, bounded knowledge, 
potential and actual mistakes, and disorganization. It is unfolding and 
undetermined. Confronted with this process, the accounting system con-
stitutes a special mode of representing, organizing, and regulating the 
enduring economic organization and its becoming. It deals with price 
formation, carried immobilizations (investments), overhead allocation, 
and all the concerns that are at the core of everyday business activity 
through time, space, and interaction. 
In conclusion, the firm and its accounting system are not reducible 
to a mere “nexus of market prices” based upon tradable ownership rights. 
On the contrary, the accounting system constitutes an integral part of the 
“institutional structure of production,” which can no longer be reduced to 
markets, ownership, and legal forms alone. This approach leads to an 
understanding of the firm as an enterprise entity that is functionally 
shaped by the relationship between management, organization, and the 
accounting system. Together, these constituents play an active role in the 
economic and monetary process of creating and allocating resources 
(production and distribution of wealth), along with accounting, mapping, 
and mediating enterprise processes that link organization and manage-
ment with the enterprise field. This understanding has significant impli-
cations for corporate governance and disclosure, which are discussed in 
the following part. 
IV. GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE OF  
THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE ENTITY 
Notwithstanding the factual problems with market and ownership 
views mentioned above, we are free to pretend that either markets or 
shareholders should dominate firms, and we should take full responsibil-
ity for the consequences of this choice. In fact, this has been the main 
attitude for the last three decades of corporate governance and regulation. 
For instance, an ownership view has been the basis of converging con-
ceptual frameworks of financial reporting established by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in North America and the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In defining financial instru-
ments with characteristics of equity,45 FASB states the following: 
                                                 
 45. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., PRELIMINARY VIEWS: FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH 
CHARACTERISTICS OF EQUITY (2007). Through a joint project on liabilities and equity, the FASB 
and IASB are seeking to address unresolved issues concerning classifying financial instruments as 
equity or liabilities. As part of this process, the FASB issued its report, Preliminary Views: Financial 
Instruments with Characteristics of Equity, describing three possible approaches—basic ownership, 
ownership settlement, and reassessed expected outcomes—and from these selected the basic-
ownership approach. Id. at iii. 
406 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:391 
[A]n instrument would be classified as equity if it (1) is the most 
subordinated interest in an entity and (2) entitles the holder to a 
share of the entity’s net assets after all higher priority claims have 
been satisfied. The holders of equity instruments are viewed as the 
owners of the entity . . . . The underlying principle of the basic 
ownership approach is that claims against the entity’s assets are lia-
bilities (or assets) if they reduce (or enhance) the net assets availa-
ble to the owners of the entity.46 
As Jensen candidly argues, “[i]n the end, of course, we are all inter-
ested in normative questions; a desire to understand how to accomplish 
goals motivates our interest in these methodological topics and in posi-
tive theories.”47 Milton Friedman’s “what if” argument may also be of-
fered as a defense of this normative attitude.48 Still, while a theory is 
obviously concerned with what is and what should be, it also concerns 
what can be. Whether it has some predictive power or not, a theory’s 
overall framing of facts and potentials is critical whenever recommenda-
tions on alternative actions and alternative regulatory regimes are under 
consideration. Otherwise, poor policies may result, thus dampening 
economy and society. 
Contrary to shareholder value rhetoric, financial crises, scandals, 
and shortcomings suggest that a market- and ownership-based approach 
to the firm provides limited understanding. Its theoretical choice to ig-
nore the firm has eventually transformed it into an unaddressed field of 
overwhelming power. Consequently, the firm, as a phantom, haunts the 
socioeconomic realm, and headlines reporting massive shortcomings 
reveal how powerful this phantom can be. 
Advocates of shareholder value have been concerned with public 
(governmental) powers,49 but private (financial) powers can also raise 
legitimate economic and societal concerns. It is astonishing to see how 
recent neoliberal thinking criticizes governmental intervention, ignoring 
private power use and abuse. But should a liberal perspective seek to 
protect individuals from powers, both public and private? Should it pri-
oritize human liberty, autonomy, and justice over laissez-faire in eco-
                                                 
 46. Id. 
 47. Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 320 
(1983). 
 48. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). For criticism 
on this epistemological position, see Robert N. Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, in 
THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 186; Robert S. Kaplan, Comments on Wilson and Jensen, 
58 ACCT. REV. 340 (1983); Herbert A. Simon, Discussion: Problems of Methodology¸ 53 AM. ECON. 
REV. 229 (1963); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. 
ECON. REV. 493 (1979). 
 49. UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 42 (2008); 
Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998). 
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nomic affairs? Liberal thinkers have legitimately called for institutions to 
regulate the polity in order to generate a socioeconomic order that ac-
commodates the immanent divergence and conflicts of interest among 
individuals. Private and public orderings combine to generate govern-
ance and regulation that cannot merely be reduced to governmental in-
tervention, while “deregulation” has no meaning in this context. 
It is misleading to adopt a theoretical view that excludes, by as-
sumption, immanent and potential problems that can occur and should be 
addressed. This was the case with equilibrium approaches to financial-
market dynamics.50 This is the case with current approaches to the theory 
of the firm as well. In contrast to the voluntary myopia that shareholder 
value rhetoric defends, the view of the firm as an enterprise entity takes 
the firm seriously. Pursuant to this view, governance and regulation of 
business firms are upgraded from a logic of ownership and securities 
markets to one of accountability,51 where the institutional framework is 
designed and enforced to assure this accountability. The firm as such no 
longer disappears from the economy and society; rather, it plays an ac-
tive role in the process of creation and allocation of resources.52 Indeed, 
what about corporate governance and the social responsibility of its man-
agement? Management controls ongoing business activities and business 
incomes generated by the enterprise entity under its fiduciary responsi-
bility; accounting systems are a key mode of this control. Under this 
approach, management of the enterprise entity is the economic core of 
the business firm, with significant implications for enterprise governance 
and disclosure. 
                                                 
 50. Margaret M. Blair, Making Money: Leverage and Private Sector Money Creation, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 417 (2013); see Yuri Biondi, Money Without Value, supra note 5; Alan Kirman, 
The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor Has No Clothes, 99 ECON. J. 126 
(1989); see also HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS (1997); Shubik, 
supra note 17; Masanao Aoki & Hiroshi Yoshikawa, The Nature of Equilibrium in Macroeconom-
ics: A Critique of Equilibrium Search Theory, 3 ECON.: OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-
JOURNAL 37 (2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-37. 
 51. As a matter of fact, these three logics interact simultaneously in the actual field of the 
business firm, constituting dynamic sources of tension, conflict, and transformation. Here, we are 
theoretically arguing for a preference or hierarchy between them as a focus and principle of refer-
ence. See Marc T. Moore & Antoine Reberioux, Unearthing the Institutional Roots of Anglo-
American Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84 (2011). 
 52. In a neglected paper, Gardiner Means explains stagflation—the simultaneous presence of 
inflation and recession, including unemployment, in the macro-economy—with corporate power and 
its “exercise of pricing discretion.” Gardiner C. Means, Corporate Power in the Marketplace, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 467, 476 (1983). 
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A. Implications of the Enterprise Entity View for  
Governance and Disclosure 
In recent decades, governance and disclosure have been driven by 
shareholder value rhetoric,53 which in turn relies on securities markets 
and ownership for control. The “institutional structure of production” is 
then expected to make shareholder power over corporate governance and 
disclosure both operational and enforceable. However, even if coupled 
with securities trading, ownership still cannot grasp the whole institu-
tional structure of production. This structure is concerned with sustain-
ability, accountability, and responsibility within the special field gener-
ated by the ongoing business firm. Accounting systems are an integral 
part of this structure because they make the firm and its management 
accountable. In this context, accounting becomes a way to represent, 
organize, and regulate the dynamic system of the business firm. Even in 
the complete absence of markets and ownership (and their alleged con-
trol over management), accounting systems assume an active role in rep-
resenting, organizing, and governing the ongoing activities of the enter-
prise entity as a whole. 
In turn, the firm itself constitutes a socioeconomic field fraught 
with unfolding changes and asymmetries of resources, access, control, 
and knowledge among different stakeholders, including shareholders, 
and management. This field involves temporal, interactive, and holistic 
concerns that cannot be addressed on individual or contractual bases. In a 
world of pure law, every business activity can be controlled ex ante by 
external forces driven by immediately enforceable rules and contractual 
claims. This is strikingly analogous to the world of perfect and complete 
markets, where outside market prices suffice to secure the socioeconomic 
interests of each stakeholder committed to the business enterprise, where 
every business activity would be controlled ex ante by external forces 
driven by the price mechanism and monetary incentives. In contrast, in 
the world of complex organizations concerned with unfolding changes 
and limited rationality, every ongoing entity involves a financial-
economic core existing beneath the transactions formalized in contracts 
and payments. 
                                                 
 53. Yuri Biondi & Isabelle Chambost, Gouvernance, Transparence et Encastrement Cognitif 
des Marchés Financiers: Le Cas des Analystes Financiers [Governance, Transparency and Cogni-
tive Embeddedness: The Case of Financial Analysis], REVUE FRANÇAISE DE GOUVERNANCE 
D’ENTREPRISE, Apr. 2009; Yuri Biondi & Antoine Reberioux, The Governance of Intangibles: 
Rethinking Financial Reporting and the Board of Directors, 36 ACCT. F. 279 (2012), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0155998212000221 (presented to the IPR Confer-
ence, “Governance, Intangibles & Corporate Social Responsibility,” in Collegio S. Chiara, Univer-
sity of Siena, on September 29, 2008). 
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Within this financial-economic core, contracts are necessarily in-
complete, and markets (when they exist) are never perfect. In this void, 
the firm acquires a dynamic and collective dimension that generates a 
field of power.54 As Berle recognized early on, legalistic reasoning can-
not deal with this power because the formal conformity to rules may hide 
unfair behavior, fraud, and abuses.55 This situation is at the very root of 
the legal-economic concept of “equitable interest,” that is, a legitimate 
interest that the bearer might be unable to defend through contractual 
enforcement of rights and claims.56 The institutional system of protec-
tion—comprising governance and regulation—fills this void so as to 
address the “equitable interests” of stakeholders, including shareholders, 
relying on the firm for the joint accomplishment of goals, but substan-
tially, though not formally, lacking contractual enforcement by courts or 
market outward options. Public and private orderings combine then to 
balance the interests of shareholders with those of other stakeholders, 
and to protect those interests along with the continuity of the business 
enterprise over time. This approach provides managers and judges with a 
clue to comprehend the socioeconomic dynamics of the joint concern as 
“fair” business conduct because it takes into account “other people’s 
interests.”57 
From this perspective, the institutional structure (including its ac-
counting system) enters into the firm’s field as an accountability device 
concerned with sustainability and responsibility of the joint-business 
affair over time. This enterprise entity approach guides the institutional 
analysis of the firm: (1) the entity is a “joint and becoming concern, 
autonomous from stakeholders (including shareholders);58 (2) there is 
separation between ownership and control, control and management, and 
management and ownership; (3) “[a]bsentee ownership” (and the differ-
ence between the legal and economic frontiers) applies; (4) [a]ccounting 
systems play a definite role in the enterprise process; and (5) accounting 
                                                 
 54. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11; Sadao Takatera & Norio Sawabe, Time and Space 
in Income Accounting, 25 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 787 (2000). 
 55. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11. 
 56. See generally SABINE MONTAGNE, LES FONDS DE PENSION: ENTRE PROTECTION SOCIALE 
ET SPECULATION FINANCIERE 46 (2006) (dealing with the emergence of the notion of “equity” and 
“equitable interest” in trust regulation). 
 57. According to Adam Smith, the management of the affairs of a public company is concerned 
with “other people’s money,” and this may eventually lead to negligence and profusion. ADAM 
SMITH, THE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 439 (1776). 
 58. This concept expands upon the notion of “going concern” that John R. Commons distilled 
from legal-economic practices as a theoretical keystone of his institutional economics. The notion of 
going concern was stressed by early accounting-entity theorists at least until the sixties. Cf. Biondi, 
supra note 23. 
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systems further distinguish this enterprise process from, and articulate it 
with, the value (and valuation) of shareholders’ equity shares. 
For matters of governance and disclosure, the enterprise entity con-
stitutes a “joint and becoming concern” (point 1). Some legal and eco-
nomic features define economic autonomy and continuity of the firm. In 
particular, shareholders have limited financial liability and benefit from 
an unconstrained right of “exit,” while prior legal protection is granted to 
other stakeholders against shareholders in some circumstances. More-
over, through its legal structure—comprising a variety of legal forms and 
arrangements, including corporations, vehicles, mandates, and fiduciary 
duties—the entity acquires legal capacity to enter into contracts and obli-
gations, to hold autonomous (collective) property, and to possess assets, 
and it has priority in controlling cash flows, incomes, and results. These 
features contribute to separate shareholding from the corporation that 
issued those shares, as well as to separate the corporation from the whole 
business enterprise.59 Additionally, enterprise groups feature the financial 
structure and reinforce both separations.60 Together, these separations 
point to the distinction between shareholding on the one hand, and man-
agement (namely possession) on the other. Only management is entitled 
to dispose of assets and cash flow, and to organize the activity of the 
business enterprise (point 2). In turn, this managerial power (or autono-
mous decision making) requires an institutional system of control for 
regulation and supervision. Here, the notion of “absentee ownership”61 
becomes critical (point 3): A large number of shareholders each holding 
only a small part of shareholder equity, and excluded from relevant deci-
sion making, while influential insiders—including significant minority 
shareholders, investment funds, and financial intermediaries—can con-
trol the firm at a distance by influencing managerial decision making and 
rule making both inside and outside the firm.62 
In this context, legal forms—related to corporate frontiers—are dis-
tinct from the socioeconomic frontiers of the firm, that is, the economic 
substance of the business enterprise. This is the primary reason for ac-
countants to look beyond legal forms to account for the business enter-
prise on a more appropriate basis (point 4). In turn, this implies the sepa-
                                                 
 59. Robé, supra note 27. 
 60. Strasser & Blumberg, supra note 38. 
 61. See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923); Williams, supra note 3. 
 62. On the myth of diffuse ownership in the United States and abroad, see AGLIETTA & 
REBERIOUX, supra note 7; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social 
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2007); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. 
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ration between accounting system and the valuation of equity shares 
(point 5). The reference to value is surely the most insidious issue raised 
by shareholder value rhetoric. The latter reduces the firm to a security 
that can be traded among allegedly homogeneous investors at current 
market prices, which would be the best (or only) way to learn its intrinsic 
value. “In a volume on economics recently published we find that ‘price 
is a concrete manifestation of value.’ We are already familiar with the 
incarnations of Buddha. To them we are now asked to add the incarna-
tions of Value.”63 
The mirage of value overshadows not only the individual features 
and strategies of idiosyncratic investors but also the connection of every 
investor to the business firm as a dynamic collective entity. The financial 
and monetary process generated by the entity is reducible to past and 
future cash flows, like a slot machine.64 But management and governance 
of an enterprise group producing a range of products and services in doz-
ens of countries and jurisdictions surely require a level of control and 
representation that is not reducible to share market prices cashed out in 
trading (if available).65 Therefore, instead of broadcasting the firm as a 
proprietary placement, accounting systems are structured to provide rele-
vant and reliable representation and control of consolidated accounting 
entities. Furthermore, accounting systems enforce institutional regula-
tions regarding dividend payments and repayments of shareholder equity, 
provision of regulatory reserves, and retention of net earnings. The insti-
tutional role of accounting is reinforced by the fact that the enterprise 
entity does not have to repay shares at their value—either market or ac-
counting value—until liquidation, while shareholders can exit their in-
vestments by selling them through the share exchange. In sum, the insti-
tutional structure of the firm acts as a shield, locking in financial re-
sources committed to the firm and required for the continuity of the en-
terprise over time.66 In this context, Fama’s rebuttal of the ownership of 
the firm67 is partial, maintaining the “ownership” of financial capital and 
empowering shareholders as residual claimants.68 Blair explains: 
                                                 
 63. VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY 30 n.1 (Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur Living-
ston trans., Arthur Livingston ed., 1935) (1906). 
 64. In a similar vein, the Boston Consulting Group invented the expression “cash cow” to name 
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 65. Through his prophetic style, Veblen strives to distinguish technological production and 
progress, driven by engineering from a cash focus led by financiers, in the business enterprise field. 
See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904). 
 66. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 67. Eugene F. Fama explains:  
[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. Each factor in 
a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of contracts covering the way in-
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[S]hareholder value advocates argue . . . shareholders act as the re-
sidual claimants, and also have certain control rights. So, advocates 
believe, it is a useful, and not misleading, shorthand expression to 
call shareholders the ‘owners.’ The rhetoric of ‘ownership,’ how-
ever, subtly redefines corporations in terms of the presumed prop-
erty rights of one class of participants in the firm, thereby adding a 
tone of moral superiority to the idea that corporations should be run 
in the sole interest of shareholder. . . .69 
However, shareholders own only their own shares, while financial re-
sources are indefinitely committed to the business firm. Until and unless 
liquidation occurs, shareholders remain creditors to the firm up to the 
limit of committed financial resources that cannot be withdrawn at will, 
as J.A. Schumpeter masterfully argued.70 Nevertheless, they are allowed 
to exit their commitment by freely selling their shares. In this way, even 
in the case of financial distress, they have limited responsibility and may 
leave the firm before other constituencies with more dependent and spe-
cific commitments. On the point, in direct response to Jensen’s com-
ments in 1983, Kaplan argues for an entity perspective: 
The shareholder, as an owner of property rights in the decision mak-
ing of the firm, is likely an anachronism at this time. The long-term 
interests of the corporation are more likely to be vested de facto, but 
not legally, with the managers, workers, suppliers, customers, and 
the community of the firm. These economic agents have much more 
non-diversifiable risk associated with the firm and a longer contrac-
tual history that the existing shareholders.71 
Because the firm cannot be reduced and limited to its shareholders, its 
relationship with shareholder claims should be addressed and clarified, 
which is the focus of the next section. 
B. The Enterprise Entity and Shareholders’ Claims 
The operation of the firm as an enterprise entity frames and shapes 
its relationship with potential and actual shareholders, including their 
                                                                                                             
puts are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among in-
puts. In this ‘nexus of contracts’ perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant con-
cept. 
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 68. Cf. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 
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 69. Blair, supra note 7, at 57. 
 70. Yuri Biondi, Schumpeter’s Economic Theory and the Dynamic Accounting View of the 
Firm: Neglected Pages from the Theory of Economic Development, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 525 (2008). 
 71. Kaplan, supra note 48, at 343–44 (emphases added). 
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remuneration. According to Shleifer and Vishny’s narrow definition, 
“[c]orporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of fi-
nance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their in-
vestment[,]”72 in the form of either a market return (capital gains be-
tween buying and selling prices), or a comprehensive return including 
dividends. However, the market value is external to the enterprise proc-
ess (according to point 5 above), and the distribution of dividends is gen-
erally subordinate to, and constrained by, net earnings as determined by 
the accounting system (point 4 above). 
Therefore, shareholder remuneration depends on the status and role 
of shareholding, its relationship to the firm as an enterprise entity, and 
further on the shareholder connection to the business-enterprise field. 
When asking what the firm does and should do for the shareholder, one 
should conversely ask what the shareholder does and should do for the 
enterprise. From the viewpoint of the enterprise entity, shareholder eq-
uity is a special source of financing. Accordingly, the accounting system 
may recognize the shareholder’s claim on the business income generated 
by the enterprise entity as a cost and allocation.73 Improved accounting 
techniques—for instance, either a “Shareholders’ Equity Interest”74 
based on the actual financial funds provided in the past, or a “Sharehold-
ers’ Equity Share” of overall net enterprise earnings as established in 
some jurisdictions—may determine this remuneration, which is already 
included in management-accounting systems. This method of accounting 
recognition differs from the definition of shareholder value provided by 
“Economic Value Added” (EVA)75 and other market-based metrics.76 
Technically speaking, the latter metrics are variants of discounted present 
value based on prospective cash flows to shareholders. EVA may be 
formalized as follows: 
 
EVA = (ROE – k) · Shareholders’ Equity =  
Net Earnings – k · Shareholders’ Equity 
 
The term ROE stands for the usual “Return on Shareholders’ Equity” and 
refers to the annual ratio of net earnings on cumulated shareholders’ eq-
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 74. ROBERT N. ANTHONY, TELL IT LIKE IT WAS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING (1983). 
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uity, including nondistributed-earnings reserve.77 The term k is the esti-
mated cost of shareholders’ capital. This determination of value added 
for shareholders implies that the whole “residual income,” if positive, 
should be allocated to shareholding. 
In contrast, “Shareholders’ Equity Interest” (SEI) and “Sharehold-
ers’ Equity Share” (SES) may be formalized as follows: 
 
SEI = i · Cumulated Shareholders’ Funds 
 
SES = s · Net Earnings 
 
The term i is the cost of committed shareholders’ funds as settled by 
management, boards of directors, shareholder meetings, statutes, by-
laws, financial securities arrangements, securities laws, regulatory bod-
ies, or other institutional arrangements. The term s is the shareholders’ 
share of net enterprise earnings, with a value generally greater than or 
equal to zero but less than one. In this context, the “cumulated share-
holders’ funds” implies the separation between funds committed by 
shareholders, including undistributed past SEIs or SESs, and entity eq-
uity, which is mainly composed by cumulated net enterprise earnings 
after SEIs or SESs.78 This definition of shareholders’ remuneration im-
plies that only a part of the whole residual income, if positive, may be 
allocated to shareholders, the remainder being available for prudential 
and environmental provisions, enterprise continuity, profit-sharing 
agreements, or donation. This is the accounting way to assure the ongo-
ing capacity of the enterprise entity to generate satisfying performances 
and fulfil all its obligations over time, including but not limited to share-
holders’ remuneration. This also constitutes a purpose and scope that can 
be and has been instituted as an alternative to shareholder value maximi-
zation. 
More generally, the EVA metric points to the fair value accounting 
perspective that translates shareholder value rhetoric in accounting regu-
                                                 
 77. Financial analysis sometimes estimates shareholder equity at its market value, which is 
inconsistent with the enterprise entity approach. 
 78. Both definitions, as well as EVA, imply the determination of the firm’s capital and income. 
In turn, this determination depends not only on matters of accounting elements’ (equity, liability, 
revenue, and expense) measurement, but also on entity perimeter, and on the recognition of account-
ing elements. Whether a transaction or a business unit is included in the entity or the distinctions 
between equity and liability, revenue and liability, and expense and asset, has a distinctive impact on 
capital and income, and thus on those measures of performance that deal with representation and 
allocation of resources within the firm. Cf. Yuri Biondi, Cost of Capital, Discounting, and Relational 
Contracting: Endogenous Optimal Return and Duration of Joint Investment Projects, 43 APPLIED 
ECON. 4847 (2011); Biondi, Money Without Value, supra note 5; Biondi, The Problem of Social 
Income, supra note 24; Biondi, The Pure Logic of Accounting, supra note 24. 
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lation, while the SEI or SES improves on classic accounting systems 
based on historical cost invested and revenue generated by the enterprise 
entity over time. Further, shareholder value replaces the maintenance of 
past nominal financial commitments with a new concept that includes the 
opportunity cost of capital, defining shareholder equity in terms of ca-
pacity to earn the current market rate of return.79 But the enterprise entity 
approach relies on the specific economic and monetary process of the 
firm to deliver a financial performance that does not have a market basis. 
“Historical cost” accounting fits and represents this enterprise process. 
Incidentally, control of financial performance does not resolve 
every matter for which the management of the business firm is account-
able.80 Regarding this extra-financial dimension of the firm, shareholder 
value is at odds with the justification of supplementary accounting sys-
tems for environmental and societal issues because, under this approach, 
the social responsibility of business is anything but creating shareholder 
profits as usual (echoing Friedman’s adage). Conversely, the enterprise 
entity approach may easily provide a more integrated, comprehensive 
view on accountability of business affairs. Examples of voluntary disclo-
sure regarding this extra-financial dimension already exist, and some 
jurisdictions have already made it compulsory.81 
V. CONCLUSION 
An institutional economic upgrade is required to better understand 
the firm as an institution and organization with a distinctive role in econ-
omy and society. This Article has argued for a comprehensive approach 
linking economics, accounting, and law around the common notion of 
the firm as an enterprise entity.82 This theoretical development is origi-
nal, but not isolated in the current debate. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 
speak about the management of off-contractual relations to understand 
the socioeconomic core of the firm, while Rajan and Zingales are con-
cerned with the integrity of this core against the “dark side of the owner-
ship.”83 Blair and Stout argue for the autonomy and continuity of the 
                                                 
 79. The International Accounting Standards Committee (nowadays International Accounting 
Standards Board) suggested this conception for financial assets and liabilities. INT’L ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS COMM., ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL ASSETS AND FINANCIAL LIABILITIES §§ 2.4–2.7 
(1997). 
 80. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990); Biondi, The Problem of Social Income, supra note 24; Blair, supra 
note 7; Robé, supra note 27. 
 81. Biondi & Reberioux, supra note 53. 
 82. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11. 
 83. See generally George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Bringing the Market 
Inside the Firm?, 91 AM. ECON. REV 212 (2001); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a 
Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998). 
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legal-economic entity that concerns various stakeholders, including 
shareholders, complementing this claim with a constructive critique of 
the efficient financial market hypothesis.84 The enterprise entity view 
understands the firm as a whole: a dynamic system of relationships, not 
merely comprising contracts or bargaining. From this perspective, order 
and disorder, efficiency and waste, honesty and guile, and development 
and distress have much to do with the structure of these relationships 
(more so than what existing theories have already recognized). This 
comprehensive view provides valuable insight into better understanding 
(1) the fundamental economic nature and very existence of the firm, (2) 
the separation between ownership, control, and management, and (3) the 
related systems of governance and disclosure required to control the 
management of the firm as an enterprise entity. 
                                                 
 84. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 
(2003); Lynn A. Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, 14 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATIONS 95 
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Convivium, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. (2011), commented on by Yuri Biondi, Disagreement-Based Trad-
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L. (2011), and by Pierre-Charles M. Pradier, Administering Systemic Risk vs. Administering Justice: 
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